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Note
Excessive Sanctions & Evolving Standards of
Decency: The Mitigating Nature of Sexual
Trauma for Juvenile Survivors Who Murder
Ingrid Hofeldt*
Approximately 2,500 Americans sit behind bars serving life
without parole (LWOP) sentences for murders they committed
as children.1 A huge proportion of juvenile murderers
experienced horrific harms, ranging from violent abuses in their
neighborhood parks to sexual abuse in the hidden corners of
their homes, but lacked the tools to manage, heal, and initiate
recovery from their traumas.2 These youth, many of whom are
now adults, received sentences that often did not account for the
mitigating nature of their traumas.3
This Note will argue that juvenile murder defendants with
trauma histories generally, and sexual trauma histories
specifically, deserve shorter sentences given the impact of that
trauma on their development. It will further argue that courts
do not sufficiently consider the mitigating evidence of sexual
trauma when sentencing youth for murder. Part I will examine
the neurological, sociological, and psychological research on the
relationship between abuse and juvenile murder, illustrating
how abuse strongly correlates with violent behavior among a
subset of these children. Part II will showcase the limitations of
evidence at sentencing and the extent to which evidence of
© 2022 Ingrid Hofeldt
* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota School of Law. Many thanks
to Professor Alan Rozenshtein for his valuable feedback and counseling
throughout the writing process, and to Nigel Hofeldt, Julie Berger, Sydney
Goggins, Fabiola Gretzinger, and Matt Jacobs for their unwavering support.
1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STATE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 2,574
JUVENILE OFFENDERS SERVING JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (2009),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/JLWOP_Table_May_7
_2009.pdf (data compiled between 2004 and 2009).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part III.
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trauma actually impacts juvenile murder defendants’ sentences.
Part III will argue that the current framework for sentencing a
population of defendants who disproportionately experience
arguably mitigating circumstances serves no moral, legal, or
policy purpose. This Note concludes that while courts have
begun to dabble in trauma-informed sentencing, on a structural
level the government must shift resources from the juvenile
criminal legal system towards earlier public health
interventions because these defendants’ abuse histories are a
public health crisis for defendants, their victims, and their
communities. This reallocation is necessary to avoid committing
a grave injustice against some of this country’s most vulnerable
youth.
I.

THE PROBLEM: HOW SEXUAL ABUSE HARMS A
SUBSET OF JUVENILE MURDERERS

A. THE PERNICIOUS CORRELATION BETWEEN SEXUAL TRAUMA
HISTORIES AND MURDER CONVICTIONS
Numerous psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and
criminologists have found a strong relationship between
criminal behavior and childhood trauma.4 Ninety-five percent of

4. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE
LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 2 (2012), https://www
.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-lives-of-juvenile-lifers-findings-from-anational-survey/ (reporting that 46.7% of juveniles sentenced to LWOP
experienced physical abuse and 20.5% experienced sexual abuse); Yael Cannon
& Andrew Hsi, Disrupting the Path from Childhood Trauma to Juvenile Justice:
An Upstream Health and Justice Approach, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 426,
448–59 (2016) (detailing how dozens of studies have shown a strong correlation
between incarceration, child abuse, and other adverse childhood experiences
(ACE) factors); see also Lauren Ashbaugh, Child Sexual Abuse and
Revictimization in Incarcerated Men and Women: Incidence and Vulnerability
5 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file
with ProQuest) (“59% of [incarcerated males] reported experiencing sexual
molestation, compared with the [5–8% of the general population].” (citing
Johnson et al., A History of Drug Use and Childhood Sexual Abuse Among
Incarcerated Males in a County Jail, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 211 (2005)));
Irina Alexandrovna Komarovskaya et al., Exploring Gender Differences in
Trauma Exposure and the Emergence of Symptoms of PTSD Among
Incarcerated Men and Women, 22 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 395, 401
tbl.1 (2011) (determining that 95% of incarcerated people have trauma
histories, 21% of incarcerated men experienced sexual abuse and 84%
experienced non-sexual abuse); Stacey Nofziger & Don Kurtz, Violent Lives: A
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men5 incarcerated for any crime have trauma histories.6
Focusing on juveniles incarcerated for murder, many have
Adverse Childhood Experience (ACE) scores in the highest 0.1%
of society,7 which means they experienced traumas more
numerous and severe than 99.9% of society. These adverse
experiences include witnessing violence at home (79% of juvenile
lifers), physical abuse (46.9% of juvenile lifers), and sexual abuse
(20.5% of juvenile lifers).8
Examining child abuse specifically, the relationship
between this particular trauma and later criminal activity
remains significant. Sexual abuse has the strongest
correlational effect of any trauma, with sexual abuse survivors
24.5% more likely than their non-sexually abused peers to
commit non-drug crimes.9 Several studies have documented
sexual abuse rates between 21% and 59% among incarcerated
men, with reported physical abuse rates as high as 84%.10
Lifestyle Model Linking Exposure to Violence to Juvenile Violent Offending, 42
J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 5 (2005) (arguing that there is a relationship
between certain trauma and violent offending).
5. Regarding gender, this Note uses the languages of the studies it cites
to remain consistent and accurately reflective of the content of those studies;
however, many studies fail to include or record the genders of nonbinary or
trans individuals, which is exclusionary and harmful to trans and nonbinary
communities.
6. See Komarovskaya et al., supra note 4.
7. James Garbarino, ACEs in the Criminal Justice System, 17 ACAD.
PEDIATRICS S32, S32 (2017) (“[O]nly 0.01% of Americans (1 in 1000) report an
ACEs score of 8, 9, or 10. The scores reported by the last 10 killers I interviewed
[who committed murder as adolescents or young adults] . . . had an average
score of 8.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Vincent J. Felitti et al.,
Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many the
Leading Causes of Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 245, 248
(1998) (creating the category of ACEs and showing the relationship between
ACEs and risk factors for the leading causes of death in adults).
8. NELLIS, supra note 4.
9. Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Understanding the Cycle: Childhood
Maltreatment and Future Crime, 47 J. HUM. RES. 509, 529 (2012).
10. Komarovskaya et al., supra note 4 (reporting that 21% of incarcerated
men reported sexual abuse and 84% reported non-sexual abuse histories);
Bonnie E. Carlson & Michael S. Shafer, Traumatic Histories and Stressful Life
Events of Incarcerated Parents: Childhood and Adult Trauma Histories, 90
PRISON J. 475, 476, 478, 485 (2010) (noting studies that show 16.4% of
incarcerated men had experienced physical abuse and 8.8% had experienced
sexual abuse also noting other studies (e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 4) that
found physical abuse rates as high as 59%); see also Marjory Anne Henderson
Marquardt, Fallacious Reasoning: Revisiting the Roper Trilogy in Light of the
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Some researchers postulate these rates would rise even
higher with proper surveying techniques and fewer social
barriers to disclosure.11 Men and boys cite guilt, self-blame,
shame, fear of homophobia, and fear of being labeled pedophiles
as barriers to disclosure of sexual trauma.12 Additionally,
society’s pressure on men to embody a strong, hegemonic
masculinity prevents male child sexual abuse survivors from
coming forward with their experiences.13 These gendered
barriers to disclosure illustrate the difficulty of assessing the
true scope of this issue.14
At first glance, the correlation between trauma and juvenile
murder convictions might appear to reflect the widespread,
pernicious severity of child abuse in the United States overall;
however, when flipping this coin and examining the proportion
of trauma survivors who commit violent crimes, the strong
association remains. Incarcerated people are more likely to have
trauma histories, but people with trauma histories are also more
likely to commit crimes that catalyze incarceration.15 Abused
and neglected children are almost twice as likely to perpetrate
violent criminal behavior, with over 50% of abuse survivors selfreporting violent actions or accruing violent criminal charges.16
Researchers tracking 900 victims of childhood abuse and neglect
found that by age thirty-two, half of their sample population had
committed non-traffic offenses, and 18% had committed violent

Sexual-Abuse-to-Prison Pipeline, 72 STAN. L. REV. 749, 765–66 (2020)
(discussing gender disparity of sexual abuse histories in incarcerated juveniles).
11. See, e.g., Kevin M. Gorey & Donald R. Leslie, The Prevalence of Child
Sexual Abuse: Integrative Review Adjustment for Potential Response and
Measurement Biases, 21 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 391, 391–96 (1997) (finding
that sexual abuse rates rise significantly when researchers use broader survey
language; for example, using the phrase “Someone touched my genitals when I
did not want them to” instead of using the phrase “I was sexually abused”).
12. Marudan Sivagurunathan et al., Barriers and Facilitators Affecting
Self-Disclosure Among Male Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: The Service
Providers’ Perspective, 88 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 455, 462 (2019).
13. Id. at 463.
14. Id.
15. Izabela Milaniak & Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Child Abuse and Neglect
Increase Risk for Perpetration of Violence Inside and Outside the Home? 5
PSYCH. VIOLENCE 246, 252 (2015) (finding that 60% of abused children within
their sample study committed violent crimes, which is consistent with similar
studies that documented a range of 50–70%).
16. Id.
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offenses.17 This relationship remains when accounting for other
factors such as sex, race, and age.18
Critics could argue that these statistics reflect the strong
correlation between poverty and incarceration,19 or genes passed
from violent parents to their children.20 For example, one could
posit that an abusive parent with violent genes passed those
genes to their victim, who grew into a murderer. However,
multiple twin studies have documented that even when
controlling for genetic and environmental factors, abused twins
are more likely to develop certain mental disorders, like
substance addictions.21 Further, one study found abused twins
were significantly more likely to develop conduct disorders than
their non-abused counterparts.22 Given the complexity of human
development and the multiplicity of factors that influence each
individual’s trajectory, many remain rightly skeptical that a
specific factor like abuse makes the difference in the firing of a
trigger.23 This Note does not purport to conclude that abuse
causes murder; however, this strong correlation represents a

17. Michael G. Maxfield & Cathy Spatz Widom, The Cycle of Violence:
Revisited 6 Years Later, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 390,
390 (1996).
18. Id.
19. See Wes Moore, The Links Between Mass Incarceration and Poverty,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/links-between-mass-incarceration-and-poverty.
20. In other words, a critic would argue that other factors correlate with
incarceration statistics and that correlation does not equal causation. See
generally April Bleske-Rechek et al., Causal Inference from Descriptions of
Experimental and Non-Experimental Research: Public Understanding of
Correlation-Versus-Causation, 142 J. GEN. PSYCH. 48 passim (2015) (examining
humans’ tendency to conflate correlation with causation); Justin Peters, When
Ice Cream Sales Rise, So Do Homicides. Coincidence, or Will Your Next Cone
Murder You?, SLATE (July 9, 2013), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/07
/warm-weather-homicide-rates-when-ice-cream-sales-rise-homicides-risecoincidence.html (providing the classic example of the correlation/causation
conundrum, in which scientists discuss why murders rise when ice cream sales
rise).
21. Elliot C. Nelson et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse and Risks for Licit and
Illicit Drug-Related Outcomes: A Twin Study, 36 PSYCH. MED. 1473, 1480
(2006).
22. Stephen Dinwiddie et al., Early Sexual Abuse and Lifetime
Psychopathology: A Co-Twin Control Study, 30 PSYCH. MED. 41, 50–51 (2000).
23. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., Making Causal
Connections, in FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).
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concerning pattern that suggests a possible causal link, which
legislators would be loath to ignore.
Additionally, certain genetic characteristics linked with the
brain’s ability to manage stress illuminate the previously foggy
link between abuse and violence.24 Thirty-four percent of boys
and 15% of girls have a low-activity MAOA genotype.25 The
MAOA gene is located on the X chromosome and encodes an
enzyme that, in turn, metabolizes neurotransmitters that are
crucial to stress management.26 Individuals with low-activity
MAOA (and thus affected neurotransmitters) experience
cognitive and emotional difficulties, heightened pressure when
responding to stressful situations and increased aggression.27
According to these studies, the presence of the low-activity
MAOA gene may help explain why some maltreated children
develop antisocial behaviors while others do not.28 Researchers
found that 85% of boys who have this genetic variation and
experienced severe childhood maltreatment developed antisocial
behavior.29 Additionally, boys who were maltreated and had the
low-activity MAOA genotype were three times as likely as nonmaltreated boys with this genotype to develop a diagnosed
conduct disorder and ten times more likely to receive a violent
criminal conviction by age twenty-six.30 While the subset of boys
24. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in
Maltreated Children, 297 SCI. 851, 851–52 (2002) (following a cohort of almost
1,000 people from childhood to adulthood); David M. Fergusson, MAOA, Abuse
Exposure and Antisocial Behaviour: 30-year Longitudinal Study, 198 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 457, 457 (2011) (replicating Caspi’s study nine years later and
finding the same results); J. Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and GeneEnvironment Interaction Predicting Children’s Mental Health: New Evidence
and a Meta-Analysis, 11 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903, 903–04 (2006)
(determining a similar connection between the MAOA gene, abusive
environments, and future criminality).
25. Kim-Cohen et al., supra note 24, at 905. These studies focus on boys
because girls have two X chromosomes, making it impossible to determine
which allele is affected, and because the girl samples sizes (i.e., those having
low-MAOA) were too small to support the analyses. Id.; Caspi et al., supra note
24, at 853 n.30.
26. See Caspi et al., supra note 24, at 851.
27. Id.
28. E.g., id. (“Circumstantial evidence suggests the hypothesis that
childhood maltreatment predisposes most strongly to adult violence among
children whose MAOA is insufficient to constrain maltreatment-induced
changes to neurotransmitter systems.”).
29. Id. at 853.
30. Id.
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with abuse histories and the low-activity MAOA gene comprised
only 12% of the study cohort, they committed 44% of the cohort’s
violent convictions, even when controlling for other possible
contributing factors.31 Researchers liken the MAOA gene’s
impact on boys with abuse histories to the repercussions of a
smoking history or a diabetes diagnosis on one’s chances of
contracting heart disease.32
Figure 133

These patterns remain correlational and do not necessarily
reflect a causal relationship; however, the strength of this
31. Id.
32. See id. & n.37 (“Nonetheless, although individuals having the
combination of low-activity MAOA genotype and maltreatment were only 12%
of the male birth cohort, they accounted for 44% of the cohort’s violent
convictions, yielding an attributable risk fraction (11%) comparable to that of
the major risk factors associated with cardiovascular disease.”).
33. Id. at 852 fig.1.
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correlation indicates that researchers should devote further time
and energy to exploring possible causality.
Critics might argue that, while many child abuse survivors
murder, thousands of child abuse survivors do not murder.34
Additionally, while abuse may harm children greatly, abusers do
not hand each child they harm a weapon and propel them in the
direction of an unwitting victim. These critics are correct that
this analysis presents patterns, not definitive neurological maps
demonstrating a clear trajectory from abuse to murder.
However, this strong correlation, particularly considering the
MAOA genotype’s influence, indicates that a troubling
relationship between abuse and murder exists that merits
further examination. It may prove impossible to scientifically
document clear causation between abuse and murder because of
the complexities of research involving humans, but given the
severity of abuse and the ubiquity of the correlation between
abuse and murder, a prima facie case exists for abuse as
somewhat mitigating or exculpatory. This Note does not
necessarily argue for automatically freeing potentially
dangerous abuse survivors from prison, pushing them back into
the public. It merely argues that when present, documented, and
related to the crime in question, an abuse history could serve as
a reason for shortening a juvenile’s LWOP sentence.
B. TRAUMA CHANGES YOUTHS’ ALREADY UNDERDEVELOPED
BRAINS, EXACERBATING THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH PROCESSING
EMOTIONS AND RESPONDING TO STRESS
Now that this Note has explored the relationship between
trauma and LWOP murder sentences, it will examine child
abuse survivors’ neurological development. Child abuse does not
just create emotional pain for children but sculpts their bodies,
rewires their brains, and shapes their neurological evolution

34. E.g., Melanie Phillips, Criminals Deserve Punishment, Not Excuses,
TIMES, (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/criminals-deservepunishment-not-excuses-mw59jxzsr (arguing that “casting as victims of
circumstances those who commit crime comes close to giving them a free pass”);
see also ANTOINETTE KAVANAUGH & THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATIONS FOR
SENTENCING OF JUVENILES IN CRIMINAL COURT 30 (2021) (“[K]nowledge of a
youth’s psychosocial immaturity . . . at the time of the offense does not mean
that this condition necessarily influenced or accounted for the youth’s judgment
or the act itself.”).
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throughout their growth.35 The success of a child’s brain
development directly depends on the quality of their childhood.36
Rather than remaining stagnant, abused children’s brains
change to protect them from future abuse.37 Due to “[the]
interaction between nature and nurture, the brain . . . become[s]
uniquely designed to support the survival of the young child in
the world [they] experience[].”38 Following trauma, children
become more sensitive to threats and more vulnerable to stress
when faced with reminders of their abuse.39 For example,
trauma survivors are more likely to distrust others and interpret
benign actions as aggressive threats.40 “Fight or flight” reactive
behaviors are more common among physical and sexual abuse
survivors, as their brains’ crisis response systems are often
rewired to constant “crisis mode.”41 The parts of the brain
devoted to reasoning and stress management are also impacted
by their exposure to violence.42 This impact is noteworthy
because without proper development of these centers, the brain
instead depends on the amygdala, which encourages emotional

35. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1011 (2003) (describing the
numerous neurological and psychopathological impacts of child abuse on the
brain at different ages); Terrie E. Moffitt & The Klaus-Grawe 2012 Think Tank,
Childhood Exposure to Violence and Lifelong Health: Clinical Intervention
Science and Stress-Biology Research Join Forces, 25 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
1619, 1625–26 (2013) (finding that child abuse survivors have IQs five points
lower than non-survivors, but that gap grows to eight IQ points after twentyfive years).
36. JOHN RICH ET AL., DREXEL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH
CENTER FOR NONVIOLENCE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, HEALING THE HURT TRAUMA:
TRAUMA-INFORMED APPROACHES TO THE HEALTH OF BOYS AND YOUNG
MEN OF COLOR 9 (2007), https://unnaturalcauses.org/assets/uploads/file/Heali
ngtheHurt-Trauma-Rich%20et%20al.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Richard L. Gaskill & Bruce D. Perry, Child Sexual Abuse, Traumatic
Experiences, and Their Impact on the Developing Brain, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 29, 31 (Paris
Goodyear-Brown ed., 2012).
39. Id. at 33–34.
40. Id. at 35.
41. See Bruce D. Perry, Childhood Experience and the Expression of Genetic
Potential: What Childhood Neglect Tells Us About Nature and Nurture, 3 BRAIN
& MIND 79, 88–89 (2002); JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS
BECOME WHO WE ARE (2002).
42. Moffitt & The Klaus-Grawe 2012 Think Tank, supra note 35, at 1619.
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impulsivity and violence.43 Child abuse is also a major risk factor
for other psychopathologies, which could further impact the
brain’s ability to cope with stress.44
Frequent trauma triggers “overdevelopment of the more
primitive parts of the brain,” like the amygdala, which process
anger and fear.45 However, the more sophisticated pieces of the
brain devoted to reasoning and rational thought remain
underdeveloped, particularly if the abuse occurred early in the
victim’s life.46 This underdevelopment results in intellectual and
emotional limitations to abuse survivors’ brains, which is
correlated with the chronic patterns of antisocial behavior and
mental health issues that criminal psychiatrists frequently
associate with the risk of murdering.47 While children frequently
bounce back easily from physical injuries and illnesses, with
unscarred features, unbroken limbs and stronger immune
systems, they do not recover from emotional traumas as easily
or fully.
Through neuroimaging, neurologists have determined that
violent adults have the same brain abnormalities as adult
survivors of child abuse, with the same regions underdeveloped
or overutilized.48 This correlation does not indicate that child
abuse causes the reduced prefrontal cortexes in violent adults
but shows that the brains of child abuse survivors post-trauma
resemble the brains of violent adults. This pattern does not
prove that violent adults experienced trauma or abuse as

43. Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders
with a Developmental Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 834–40
(2013) (describing numerous research studies that contend that from a psychosocial perspective, emerging adults between the ages of 18 and 25 engage in
risky behavior at a level comparable to juveniles).
44. Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 339, 343–44 (1992); Richard Dembo et al., Physical
Abuse, Sexual Victimization and Illicit Drug Use: A Structural Analysis Among
High Risk Adolescents, 10 J. ADOLESCENCE 13 (1987).
45. JAMES GARBARINO, MILLER’S CHILDREN: WHY GIVING TEENAGE
KILLERS A SECOND CHANCE MATTERS FOR ALL OF US 23 (2018).
46. Perry, supra note 41, at 87.
47. Susan L. Andersen et al., Preliminary Evidence for Sensitive Periods in
the Effect of Childhood Sexual Abuse on Regional Brain Development, 20 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIENCES 292 (2008); Moffitt & The KlausGrawe 2012 Think Tank, supra note 35 (showing that researchers consistently
find these same typical patterns of neurological development post trauma in
sexual abuse survivors).
48. See Perry, supra note 41, at 92–94.
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children, but it shows that the same pernicious correlations
discussed earlier hold equally true via brain scans and
criminological research.
One feature does profoundly and definitively influence the
brain of each juvenile who murders: their youth.49 All juveniles
who commit murder naturally do so as juveniles. Youths’
adolescent brains already make them more prone to impulsive
and violent behavior.50 During adolescence, the human body
develops the parts of the brain that assist in stress management
and cognitive processing.51 Scholars liken the development of
these parts of the brain to remodeling one’s kitchen: while
someone remodels their kitchen they cannot necessarily cook as
their refrigerator, oven, or stove may be unavailable.52 Similarly,
when juveniles’ brain centers related to reasoning develop, those
centers become less usable.53 As a result, the emotions juveniles
experience feel particularly acute; however, juveniles lack the
capacity to reason in stressful situations as swiftly or thoroughly
as adults.54 These gaps in brain function intersect with the
neurological vulnerabilities of juvenile abuse survivors.55 Child
abuse survivors experience these same acute adolescent
emotions but augmented by the overdevelopment of the more
primitive and reactive parts of the brain.56 Emotional
processing, which already proves difficult for growing
adolescents, is even more challenging for adolescent abuse
survivors.
Zooming out from the brain, these structural changes within
juveniles’ brains impact how they engage with the world. John
49. See Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile
Courts, Youths in Criminal Courts, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 555–56 (2017);
Ronald
E.
Dahl,
Affect
Regulation,
Brain
Development,
and
Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001);
INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSECH. COUNCIL, THE SCIENCE OF ADOLESCENT RISKTAKING: WORKSHOP REPORT 48–49 (2011).
50. See Dahl, supra note 49.
51. GARBARINO, supra note 45, at 28 (citing research that juveniles’ nucleus
accumbens and frontal lobe are still developing throughout their teenage years).
52. See RICH ET AL., supra note 36, at 10 (“Because the cortex is under
construction, teens use more primitive parts of the brain (limbic) to manage
their emotions, and thus are more likely to react versus think and to operate
from their gut response versus reasoning.”).
53. See id.
54. Dahl, supra note 49, at 61–62.
55. See GARBARINO, supra note 45, at 30–34.
56. Id.
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Rich, an adolescent neuroscientist, explains how his clients who
have experienced intense trauma “are not likely to have learned
effective communication skills, nor can they easily engage in
conflict management because of chronic difficulties with
emotional management.”57 As a result, they often act out their
emotional pain through violence, which is corroborated by
research linking sexual abuse and aggressive behavior.58 These
neurological underdevelopments show how a young abuse
survivor’s toolbox for processing emotions and dealing with highstress situations is limited compared to an adult or nonsurvivor’s toolbox. These brain changes do not necessarily
transform youth into violent automatons, lashing out randomly
against unsuspecting victims, resulting in preordained and fated
murders; however, regardless of whether abuse functions as a
“but-for” cause of a survivor’s pulling of a trigger or wielding of
a knife, it certainly suggests that the strong neurological
patterns associated with abuse negatively affect an individual’s
ability to cope with stressful and dangerous situations.
C. THE VAST MAJORITY OF YOUTH THIS PROBLEM IMPLICATES
ARE YOUTH THAT SOCIETY ALREADY NEGLECTS: YOUNG MEN OF
COLOR FROM POOR COMMUNITIES
While girls and nonbinary children are more likely to
experience sexual abuse than boys,59 boys (those who primarily
face murder charges) are sexually abused nationally at alarming
rates ranging from 4% to 20%.60 Boys who experience sexual
abuse are frequently the most neglected boys facing the greatest

57. RICH ET AL., supra note 36, at 21–22.
58. Id.; Patricia K. Kerig, Polyvictimization and Girls’ Involvement in the
Juvenile Justice System: Investigating Gender-Differentiated Patterns of Risk,
Recidivism, and Resilience, 33 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 789 (2018);
Patricia K. Kerig & Stephen P. Becker, Trauma and Girls’ Delinquency, in
DELINQUENT GIRLS: CONTEXT, RELATIONSHIPS, AND ADAPTION 119 (2012).
59. DARKNESS TO LIGHT (D2L), CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE STATISTICS 1, http://
www.d2l.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/all_statistics_20150619.pdf,
(last
visited Nov. 24, 2021).
60. Id. (stating that one in twenty-five boys experience sexual abuse); Facts
and Stats About Child Sexual Abuse, LAUREN’S KIDS, https://laurenskids
.org/awareness/about-faqs/facts-and-stats/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021) (stating
that one in five boys experience sexual abuse); Child Sexual Abuse Statistics,
NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, https://victimsofcrime.org/child-sexualabuse-statistics/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021) (finding that 5% of boys are sexually
abused while 5–10% of males self-report childhood sexual abuse as adults).
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challenges both structurally and within their homes.61 Children
who live outside of two-parent homes and/or within homes with
frequent violence are sexually abused at higher rates than
children living in two-parent homes free from violence.62 These
correlations are unsurprising given that perpetrators report that
they search for victims from unstable homes.63
Children from the most marginalized and under-resourced
communities also experience abuse at higher rates. Foster
children are ten times more likely to experience sexual abuse,64
while children from lower socioeconomic strata65 and children
with disabilities are three times more likely.66 Boys of color in
particular face higher rates of abuse.67 African American boys
have a substantiated rate of maltreatment nearly 250% that of
white children.68 Additionally, American Indian/Alaska Native
youth and multi-racial youth are nearly twice as likely to be
sexually abused as their white counterparts.69
Juvenile LWOPers are also disproportionately children of
color. Eighty percent of youth sentenced to life are youth of color,
with over 50% identifying as African American.70 In Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, over 80% of juvenile
LWOPers are African American.71 Before Texas abolished
juvenile life without parole, 100% of juveniles serving life
61. See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, supra note 60.
62. Id. (“Children who do not live with both parents as well as children
living in homes marked by parental discord, divorce, or domestic violence have
a higher risk of being sexually abused.”); DARKNESS TO LIGHT (D2L), supra note
59 (identifying foster status, single parenthood, and not living with both parents
as risk factors for sexual abuse).
63. See DARKNESS TO LIGHT (D2L), supra note 59, at 4.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Sexual Abuse, DISABILITY JUSTICE, https://disabilityjustice.org
/sexual-abuse/#:~:text=People%20with%20disabilities%20are%20sexually
,rate%20of%20people%20without%20disabilities.&text=83%25%20of%20wome
n%20with%20disabilities,sexually%20assaulted%20in%20their%20lives (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021).
67. RICH ET AL., supra note 36, at 45.
68. Id. at 50 (“African American children have a rate of substantiated
maltreatment . . . nearly 2.5 times that for white children.”).
69. Child Maltreatment, CHILD TRENDS, https://www.childtrends.org
/indicators/child-maltreatment (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
70. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT 3 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications
/youth-sentenced-life-imprisonment/.
71. Id.
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sentences were black.72 Additionally, the FBI reports that 74%
of youth convicted of murder in North Carolina between 1994
and 2016 were black.73
These rates are noteworthy because they show how these
issues do not impact the U.S. population equally but more
commonly affect communities who historically experience higher
rates of poverty, incarceration, and trauma.
II. THE AVAILABILITY OF EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL
TRAUMA DURING SENTENCING
Now that this Note has discussed how abuse impacts
juveniles who murder, it will examine what happens to these
juveniles during sentencing. Part II will analyze the extent to
which this neurological research on trauma impacts youths’
sentences. Just because this research on sexual trauma exists
does not necessarily indicate that courts can legally use it, have
access to it, or choose to incorporate it into their sentencing
decisions.
A. WHAT JUDGES CONSIDER: A PUNITIVE SOCIAL CLIMATE,
RESTRICTIVE STATE SENTENCING STATUTES, AND A HAZY
SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVE
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the national culture around the
juvenile criminal legal system shifted from rehabilitative to
punitive.74 School shootings and widespread media messaging
around juvenile “super-predators”75 incited a moral panic and
emboldened lawmakers to pass harsh juvenile sentencing
72. Ben Finholt et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in North Carolina, 110
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 158 (2020).
73. Id. at 159.
74. Sara E. Fiorillo, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and
Remedies for the Future of Juvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095, 2100–01
& n.33 (2013) (describing how fears of the “super-predator” led states to
overwhelmingly enact policies “that ‘adultified’ juvenile offenders and focused
on punitive, rather than rehabilitative, measures,” which led to a rise in
incarcerated juveniles and increasingly severe sentences); see Vincent Schiraldi,
Media Exaggerate Scope of Country’s Juvenile Crime, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept.
26, 2005), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2000/01/30/media-exaggeratescope-of-country-s-juvenile-crime/ (“They’re the predators out there. They’re not
children anymore. They’re the most violent criminals on the face of the Earth”
(quoting U.S. Representative Bill McCollum (R-Fla.)); see also Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 554–55 (1966) (explaining how the role of juvenile courts
is to act in a parental capacity).
75. Fiorillo, supra note 74, at 2100.
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laws.76 Courts transitioned from a rehabilitative approach to
juvenile sentencing towards a punitive approach, which treated
children as smaller adults rather than beings in the process of
maturing.77
During this time period, many states passed harsh juvenile
sentencing statutes which mandated lengthy minimum
sentences for children.78 These laws reflected state legislatures’
general abhorrence for specific crimes and support for long
criminal sentences.79 By 1994, all states established at least one
mandatory minimum sentencing law.80 Some of these laws apply
to juvenile crimes, while others apply to adult crimes, but
nonetheless the laws are triggered when juveniles are tried and
sentenced as adults.81 These laws form the bedrock of judges’
ability to sentence. Even if a judge wants to impose a less lengthy
sentence for a defendant with compelling mitigating
circumstances, these laws bar that possibility.
In 2012, the Supreme Court issued a pivotal ruling that
shifted the landscape for juvenile sentencing.82 It declared that
“[t]he concept of proportionality [regarding punishment for
crime] is central to the Eighth Amendment.”83 This concept of
proportionality is viewed “less through a historical prism than
according to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’”84 In Miller v. Alabama, the
76. Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Juvenile Justice: The Legacy of
Punitive Policy, 6 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 28, 28 (2008) (“School
shootings like those that were widely publicized in the 1997-98 academic year
continue to garner headlines and to create fear that supports reactive policies.”);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 FUTURE CHILD., no. 2, 2008, at 15, 15.
77. Fiorillo, supra note 74 at 2100–01. See generally Phil Edwards, Why
Babies in Medieval Paintings Look Like Ugly Old Men, VOX (July 28, 2015),
https://www.vox.com/2015/7/8/8908825/ugly-medieval-babies.
78. Alison Powers, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory Sentencing
of Juveniles Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a Mitigating
Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 251–54 (2009). See generally Nancy Gertner,
A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just
Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691 (2010) (outlining the history of
sentencing in the American criminal legal system).
79. Powers, supra note 78, at 252.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 253.
82. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470, 489 (2012) (striking down all state
laws that require an LWOP sentence for a juvenile).
83. Id. at 469.
84. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
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Supreme Court decided that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
statutes which proscribe LWOP sentences for juveniles, and the
Court later required resentencing or the institution of parole
hearings for those sentenced to LWOP before the Miller
decision.85 Through Miller and its companion cases, the Supreme
Court shielded children from facing death and lengthy terms of
imprisonment,86 while reflecting changing ideology in the
United States about juvenile punishment and rehabilitation.87
In Miller, the Supreme Court declared in dicta that juveniles
deserve sentences that account for their: 1) lower capacity for
decision making, and 2) dependency on negative influences such
as family environment and abuse history, among other factors.88
These considerations directly implicate the sexual abuse
discussed in Part I.

85. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212–13 (2016) (explaining that
states can simply permit offenders to be considered for parole in order to comply
with the new rule created by Miller).
86. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470, 489; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79
(2005) (finding the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (declaring juvenile LWOP sentences for non-homicide
crimes unconstitutional); JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW (last updated May 2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-LifeWithout-Parole.pdf (noting that a decline has occurred in the sentencing of
juveniles to LWOP, although no exact statistic exists and that in a small
fraction of cases juveniles with existing LWOP sentences were released
post-Montgomery).
87. Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)
(finding the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 74–75, 82 (2010) (declaring juvenile LWOP sentences for non-homicide
crimes unconstitutional); ROVNER, supra note 86 (noting a decline in the
sentencing of juveniles to LWOP, although no exact statistic exists and that in
a small fraction of cases juveniles with existing LWOP sentences were released
post-Montgomery); see also Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1787, 1789 (2016) (discussing the importance of Miller and the shift it
made “in juvenile justice policy and practice.”).
88. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 476–79 (“[T]he distinctive attributes of youth
diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on
juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Because the heart of
the retribution rationale relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, the case for
retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Nor can deterrence
do the work in this context, because the same characteristics that render
juveniles less culpable than adults—their immaturity, recklessness, and
impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment.”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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Despite the pivotal shift Miller suggested, its directives
have proven difficult for lower courts to implement.89 While
Miller requires that courts consider the Miller factors when
sentencing juveniles, it does not require courts to weigh these
factors efficaciously or in the context of sound scientific or
sociological research.90 Miller does not proscribe which studies a
court should read, how courts should assess juveniles’ home
environments, whether courts should conduct psychological
tests on juvenile defendants, or how to marry research to an
individual’s circumstances. No one mandates that defense
attorneys introduce evidence related to the Miller factors or that
judges attend trainings on Miller, so these factors are assessed
in an ad hoc, inconsistent manner across fifty states with vastly
different laws on juvenile sentencing.91
While Miller struck down state laws that mandated the
imposition of an LWOP sentence, it did not remove judges’
discretion to choose to sentence a juvenile to LWOP.92 Despite
the Miller ruling, many courts across the United States still
sentence juveniles to LWOP (or effectively the equivalent of
LWOP).93 Post-Miller, twenty-five states still allow LWOP
sentences for juveniles,94 because the Miller court did not
prohibit juvenile LWOP sentences but rather prohibited
sentencing statutes that require juvenile LWOP sentences for
particular crimes.95 Even when courts do not impose juvenile
LWOP sentences, they frequently enforce lengthy sentences of

89. Drinan, supra note 87, at 1816–17.
90. Tiffani Darden, Known Unknowns: Legislating for a Juvenile’s
Reformative Uncertainty, 97 NEB. L. REV. 334 (2018).
91. Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap
Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 92,
92–93 (2013) (explaining that state legislatures can “fashion rules that
seemingly conform to . . . Miller” but nonetheless “juveniles can still be
sentenced to . . . (LWOP) on a discretionary basis”).
92. Id.
93. See Mike Wiser, Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for 38 Iowa
Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE (July 16, 2012), https://www.thegazette
.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commutes-life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murde
rers (describing how a governor commuted thirty-eight life sentences to terms
of sixty years, effectively a life sentence for those offenders).
94. ROVNER, supra note 86, at 4.
95. Id. at 3.
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several decades.96 While wrinkling its nose at lengthy juvenile
sentences, the Miller court did not entirely bar LWOP sentences
or establish mandatory minimum sentences guiding courts
towards more moderate sentence lengths.97
Additionally, multiple states have mandatory or permissive
transfer laws—established during the “tough on crime” period of
the late twentieth century—which require or allow prosecutors
to try juveniles as young as fourteen as adults.98 When juveniles
are tried as adults, the Miller protections no longer apply, which
is effectively a pathway around the Miller mandates.99
Pennsylvania, which holds the largest population of juvenile
“lifers” in the country, requires that youth charged with murder
face those charges in adult court and, upon conviction, receive
LWOP sentences.100 However, because this murder statute
applies to adults and not to children, it does not technically
violate Miller.
These sentencing laws often require judges to sentence
juvenile defendants without consideration of their age or life
circumstances,101 meaning that defendants cannot even
introduce the evidence of their life circumstances that the
Supreme Court recommended in Miller. Even the most radically
rehabilitative judges cannot grant lenient sentences without the
information to base those lenient sentences on. Mandatory
transfer laws work against the inclusion of mitigating evidence
by providing prosecutors with an opportunity to try juveniles
96. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 2019)
(upholding the thirty-five-year sentence of a gang member who had been
molested between the ages of seven and nine, physically abused throughout his
childhood, and suffered from PTSD (Sparks v. United States, No. W-99-CR-0703, 2018 WL 1415775, at *6–7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2018)); State v. Null, 836
N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (holding that the lower court erred in sentencing the
juvenile defendant to a sentence of 52.5 years, which though technically not an
LWOP sentence, still prompted the need for the Miller sentencing guidelines);
People v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal. 4th 1354, 1361, 1391–92 (2014) (remanding an
LWOP sentence but sustaining the constitutionality of the California statute
that allowed an LWOP sentence).
97. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012).
98. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 76, at 17; see also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 541 (1966) (establishing that juveniles can be transferred to adult
courts).
99. See Tchoukleva, supra note 91, at 94, 99 (observing that 200,000
children are prosecuted in adult courts annually and that at the time Miller was
decided 2,500 juveniles were sentenced to LWOP).
100. NELLIS, supra note 4, at 3.
101. Id.
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under statutes that require or allow LWOP sentences and
prohibiting judges from considering the mitigating evidence
Miller recommends.102
Further, juveniles who fear losing at trial often accept plea
agreements rather than risking LWOP sentences.103 When
defendants accept plea agreements, they never have an
opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence before a judge. For
these youth, their sentences illuminate this bargaining process
based on conviction and sentencing rates that may or may not
reflect any mitigating circumstances.104
Strong evidence exists that the imposition of juvenile LWOP
sentences is not based on the findings of “moral culpability” the
Supreme Court deemed necessary105 but instead upon the state
and county in which a crime occurs.106 Nine states, including
multiple with mandatory transfer statutes, impose over 80% of
juvenile LWOP sentences nationwide.107 Within these states,
specific counties can account for a large proportion of juvenile
LWOP sentences. For example, eleven of North Carolina’s one
hundred counties account for 61% of juvenile LWOP
sentences.108 The District Attorney for the county of
Mecklenberg sought LWOP in every single juvenile LWOP resentencing case,109 despite the Supreme Court’s instruction that
judges should impose juvenile LWOP infrequently and only
when the defendant exhibits “irreparable corruption.”110

102. See id at 6.
103. See Finholt et al., supra note 72, at 157–58.
104. Id.
105. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
106. See Finholt et al., supra note 72, at 144–45.
107. Id. at 145 & n.17 (listing California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania).
108. Id. at 160.
109. Id. at 167.
110. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (“[A]ppropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”); see also United
States v. Briones, 929 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The district court’s statement
that it considered some factors in ‘mitigation’ suggests that the district court
applied the Guidelines and began with a presumption that LWOP would be
appropriate. As we have explained, however, a sentencing court may not
presume the propriety of a Guidelines sentence, particularly in juvenile LWOP
cases after Miller.” (internal citation omitted)).
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B. MITIGATING EVIDENCE IS OFTEN UNAVAILABLE TO JUDGES
DUE TO LACK OF RESEARCH AND FUNDING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS
Even when mandatory transfer laws and high mandatory
minimums do not apply to juvenile LWOP defendants, the
necessary psychological evaluations and applicable research
prove costly, unavailable, and difficult to assess; therefore,
mitigating evidence often goes unconsidered.111 Researchers
wonder to what extent judges have the necessary training to
properly read scientific evidence, assess its efficacy, and weigh
its impact appropriately.112 Judges could have robust training in
research methodology, statistics, and the scientific method, or no
training at all.113 Further, if judges have questions regarding the
validity of scientific evidence, the courts generally lack the
resources to determine its efficacy.114 Even if the courts had the
legislative green light to consider research and clinical
evaluations, faced no procedural red tape to integrating it into
their sentencing decisions, and were properly influenced by
mitigating evidence of trauma and child abuse, without proper
111. See Philip C. O’Donnell, The Role of Psychosocial Risk Factors and
Mental Health Needs in Juvenile Sentencing Decisions 105 (Aug. 2007)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University Chicago) (on file with
ProQuest) (evaluating the extent to which judges weigh clinical evaluations
when sentencing juveniles).
112. Colleen M. Berryessa, Potential Impact of Research on Adolescent
Development on Juvenile Judge Decision-Making, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J., no. 3,
2018, at 19, 21 (discussing researchers’ concerns that judges cannot weigh
scientific data; “[T]here are concerns that judges may not be able to understand
the weight and importance of such research and how it actually relates to
demonstrated behavior when using such information in their decision-making;
this could lead to disparate case outcomes even when the presented research is
similar in cases.”); Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 869, 937 (2018) (“[T]he judiciary’s failure to fulfill its
gatekeeper role can be traced back to its refusal to demand and properly
evaluate foundational research.”); see David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why
Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social,
Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of
Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2003) (explaining the risk of complete
deference to scientific evidence and the risk of unnecessary and unfounded
critiques of evidence); Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 730, 733–34 (2013) (asserting that the
structural differences between neurological inquiries and legal inquiries make
it difficult for judges and lawyers to utilize neurological evidence).
113. See Berryessa, supra note 112.
114. See Giannelli, supra note 112, at 939 (“Only the federal government has
the resources to fund the needed independent research.”).
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scientific evidence and the knowledge of how to weigh it, the
guidance provided by Miller proves effectively useless.
Even when judges have the statutory capacity to consider
mitigating evidence of trauma and child abuse, judges can only
consider those resources if they have access to them.115 Reports
indicate that “a substantial proportion of [juveniles] never
undergo a comprehensive psychological evaluation [prior to
sentencing] because of a lack of time, resources, and effective
screening tools.”116 Researchers have questioned and critiqued
the legal system’s referral process for clinical evaluations and
the validity of those evaluations when they do occur.117 When
judges attempt to order psychological testing or referral to a
psychiatric placement rather than incarceration, the legal
system often lacks the funding to fulfill those requests.118 As one
commentator noted, relying on work by Jenny Carrol, an expert
in juvenile criminal law: “[L]ocating a neuroscientist or
psychologist with specialized understanding of the behavioral
implications of childhood sexual abuse is a daunting [and
expensive] task.”119 While findings indicate that judges may feel
swayed by clinical recommendations and psychological research,
without that research or those recommendations, even the most
passionately trauma-focused judges cannot consider such
evidence.120 The Miller court asked that judges consider
scientific evidence about youth psychology and neuroscience

115. See O’Donnell, supra note 111, at 105 (discussing the large number of
youths that do not receive a psychological evaluation).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., id. (discussing the lack of psychological examinations that are
administered and questioning whether the information used for decisions is
valid).
118. Id. at 104–05.
119. Marjory Anne Henderson Marquardt, Fallacious Reasoning: Revisiting
the Roper Trilogy in Light of the Sexual-Abuse-to-Prison Pipeline, 72 STAN. L.
REV. 749, 781 (2020) (citing Jenny E. Carroll, The Problem with Inference and
Juvenile Defendants, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 52 (2017) (“In many jurisdictions,
the prospect of locating an expert and persuading her to testify may be a
daunting proposition. Not only may the neuroscientist not be available in the
community . . . , but funds for the expert may not be available, particularly for
indigent defendants.”)).
120. See Richard E. Redding & Kirsten Brooke Hensel, Knowledgeable
Judges Make a Difference: Judicial Beliefs Affect Juvenile Court Transfer
Decisions, 62 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 15, 21 (2011) (studying how judicial beliefs
about transfers, and the availability of research findings on the counterdeterrent effects of transfer, influence judges’ transfer decisions).
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when sentencing but failed to effectively hammer out the
mechanics.121
A juvenile with an abuse history and a murder charge faces
multiple hurdles to the proper introduction of evidence of that
trauma. That juvenile could enter a courtroom in a state in
which a mandatory transfer law propels them into adult court,
or they could remain in a juvenile courtroom.122 Their defense
attorney could introduce evidence at the sentencing stage
related to their past abuse, or they could fail to include that
evidence.123 Additionally, the juvenile’s court could have the
resources to conduct a psychological evaluation, or it could lack
those resources.124 The statute under which that juvenile faces
charges could establish a strict, lengthy minimum sentence, or
no minimum sentence at all.125 Their judge could be well-versed
in sound sociological and neurological research on trauma, or
unexposed to any research whatsoever.126 That judge could be
profoundly influenced by mitigating evidence, or find it
unrelated to the matter at hand.127 Furthermore, the judge could
experience profound uncertainty, stuck between sentencing
norms, state laws allowing for lengthy sentences, and a Supreme
Court directive compelling them to engage in trauma-informed
sentencing but providing few concrete metrics to guide them.

121. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (“[A] judge or jury must
have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
122. See Tchoukleva, supra note 91, at 94 & n.7 (identifying “statutory
exclusion laws”—“which require that charges against juveniles be filed in adult
court based solely on the nature of the offense”—as one of the primary methods
by which juveniles are tried as adults).
123. See O’Donnell, supra note 111, at 50 (“[C]linicians evaluate juveniles
after a formal finding of guilt, but prior to sentencing or when an initial
sentence must be modified . . . . Any party involved in the proceedings can
request a clinical evaluation . . . .”).
124. Id. at 105.
125. See Benekos & Merlo, supra note 76, at 42–43 (discussing the
differences in state juvenile sentencing standards).
126. See Berryessa, supra note 112, at 21 (discussing the possibility of some
juvenile judges being exposed to research on trauma and the chances judges in
general are influenced by such research).
127. Id.
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III. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER CHILD ABUSE AS A
MITIGATING FACTOR WHEN SENTENCING JUVENILES
FOR MURDER
This Note argues that courts should weigh child abuse as a
mitigating factor when sentencing juveniles. Mitigation is not an
excuse but rather judicial leniency granted when the defendant
in question “deserve[s] less punishment than a typical
offender.”128 Because of the Miller directive, and based on both
major philosophies of punishment, the imposition of LWOP and
even lengthy decades-long sentences proves immoral and
ineffective.
A. THE SUPREME COURT SET THE LEGAL PRECEDENT THAT
CHILDREN’S TRAUMA HISTORIES DESERVE CONSIDERATION AT
SENTENCING AND AFFIRMED THAT CHILDREN ARE
NEUROLOGICALLY DIFFERENT
As discussed in Part II, through Miller the Supreme Court
indicated a shift in juvenile sentencing practices from punitive
to rehabilitative, and from offense-focused to individual
defendant-focused.129 Because the Supreme Court included its
guidelines for sentencing juveniles in dicta, it is lawful for judges
to neglect to consider mitigating evidence of brain development
or trauma histories; however, it would be legally consistent with
the philosophy of juvenile criminal law that the Supreme Court
signaled in Miller for judges to deny transfer requests from
prosecutors and try juveniles as juveniles whenever possible.130
A more holistic sentencing approach would certainly not violate
the law and would keep lower courts moving in the same
direction as the highest court in the land.131
Notably, the Court established multiple factors courts
should consider when sentencing juveniles, including their: 1)
lower capacity for decision making; and 2) familial and life
circumstances.132 The Court referenced numerous neurological,
128. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 76, at 19.
129. See supra Part II.A; see also Drinan, supra note 87, at 1789 (“Miller was
a revolutionary decision and . . . it portends a tremendous shift in juvenile
justice policy and practice.”).
130. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012) (discussing, in dicta,
the additional factors that should be considered in juvenile sentencing).
131. See Drinan, supra note 87, at 1827–28 (arguing for the adoption of
youth as a mitigating factor).
132. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 477.
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psychiatric, and medical sources that show a recognition of
children as growing, evolving beings with fundamental cognitive
differences from adults, which shield them from culpability as
fully matured adults.133 Multiple scholars have questioned the
logical consistency and constitutionality of imposing LWOP
sentences on juveniles through permissive juvenile LWOP
statutes or through transfer laws post-Miller.134 Trial judges
eschew Miller when they fail to consider relevant mitigating
evidence or do not weigh it effectively. From a legal perspective,
courts should truly follow the Supreme Court’s lead—and Miller
dicta—integrating the Miller factors into their sentencing
decisions.
State legislatures have also indicated a shift away from
punitive sentencing and ignoring the circumstances of the
defendant.135 Multiple states have reduced recommended
juvenile sentences or abolished punitive juvenile justice laws.136
For example, Connecticut eliminated juvenile transfer laws and
Colorado repealed all laws allowing for juvenile LWOP
sentences.137 These states’ tinkering with their juvenile justice
statutes represents a recognition that punitive policies may not
serve society’s interests. In addition to the Supreme Court’s
indication of support for shorter juvenile sentences and
Congress’s repositioning of the purposes of juvenile sentencing,

133. Id.; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005) (discussing the
slow movement away from the juvenile death penalty); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (discussing why a juvenile’s actions cannot be as morally
reprehensible as an adult’s).
134. See Tchoukleva, supra note 91, at 93 (“[S]tates are free to fashion rules
that seemingly conform to the decision in Miller while undermining its
reasoning and end goals.”); Drinan, supra note 87, at 1818 (“Of the 13 states
that have passed legislation in response to Miller, nine still permit juvenile
LWOP, and none set[s] an alternative minimum sentence at less than 25
years.”); see also NELLIS, supra note 4, at 30 (“The Supreme Court is now taking
up the issue again and will soon consider the constitutionality of applying
[juvenile] []LWOP sentences to very young offenders convicted of homicide in
situations where the sentence was mandatorily applied as well as situations
where the convicted offender was not the principal actor.”).
135. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 76, at 28–29 (discussing the recent
trend away from punitive juvenile sentencing).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 29.

2022]

EXCESSIVE SANCTIONS

439

the public has likewise indicated support for rehabilitative
sentences that account for children’s youth.138
B. UNDER THE RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT,
SENTENCING CHILDREN WITH TRAUMA HISTORIES TO LENGTHY
SENTENCES IS MORALLY QUESTIONABLE
From the dawn of the American legal system through the
end of the nineteenth century, the courts primarily sentenced
under a retributivist model, dishing out each defendant’s “just
deserts”: an eye for an eye and a life for a life, with each
defendant’s
sentence
reflecting
their
relative
blameworthiness.139 For example, a murder committed while
someone sleepwalked would not deserve the death penalty or
long imprisonment because the defendant did not consciously
intend to murder anyone and therefore deserved a more lenient
punishment.140 In contrast, someone who knowingly and
maliciously takes the life of another would deserve the death
penalty.141
The advent of neurolaw in the late twentieth century called
into question commonly held assumptions about culpability.142
Neurodeterminism, a theory promulgated by Joshua Greene and
Jonathan Cohen, holds that individuals’ actions and behaviors
are caused by neural processes rather than free will.143 Under

138. See Riane M. Bolin et al., Americans’ Opinions on Juvenile Justice:
Preferred Aims, Beliefs About Juveniles, and Blended Sentencing, 67 CRIME &
DELINQ. 262, 264–65 (2021) (explaining that most people see rehabilitation as
the main goal of the criminal legal system, but also support punitive measures
to deter juveniles).
139. See Gertner, supra note 78, 692–94 (discussing the use of retributive
justice in colonial courts through the end of the 18th century); Robert A.
Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
379, 398–99 (1979) (defining and explaining retributivism).
140. See King v. Cogdon (Vict. 1950) (Austl.) (finding a mother not guilty for
murdering her daughter while sleepwalking), quoted in SANFORD H. KADISH ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 229–30 (2017).
141. See Pugsley, supra note 139, at 399 (explaining how punishment is
determined under a retributivist theory of punishment).
142. Azim F. Shariff et al., Free Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View
of Human Nature Reduces Retribution, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1563, 1563–68 (2014)
(finding that learning about neural bases of human behavior reduced people’s
support for retributive punishment).
143. See Iskra Fileva & Jonathan Tresan, Will Retributivism Die and Will
Neuroscience Kill It? 34–35 COGNITIVE SYS. RSCH. 54, 55–56 (2015).
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this philosophy, the legal system’s entire approach to
distributing justice based on accountability is inherently flawed:
Following the logic of Greene and Cohen, the harm-producing forces of
cause and effect can be seen to pass through the wrongdoer’s sensory,
neural and motor systems in much the same way that, on a simpler
level, the electrical force of lightning can pass through a tree,
shattering a branch which then falls on a person sheltering beneath.
No one would blame the tree just because a causal chain of destructive
forces happened to pass through it. And so, one may ask, why should
we blame a person who is unlucky enough to become a conduit for a
causal chain of harm-producing forces that originated elsewhere?144

On the other side of the debate sits Stephen Morse, a neuroskeptic, who holds that neuroscientific developments do not
dispel the existence of the mind or free will.145 Professor Morse
explains that the legal system does not require the defendant’s
actions to fall under their control, only that they committed the
crime with the requisite knowledge of their actions.146 Therefore,
a child with a trauma history who experiences a “fight or flight”
reaction and pulls the trigger is still culpable even if their
actions were predetermined by their brain chemistry, because
they pulled the trigger with the knowledge that gunshots can
cause death. Greene and Cohen decry this approach as “folk
psychology” embedded in society’s misconceptions of free will
within a deterministic world.147
Professor Morse poses that “[d]espite the astonishing
advances in neuroimaging and other neuroscientific methods,”
the legal system still lacks the “sophisticated causal knowledge
of how the brain enables the mind . . . .”148 While Greene and
Cohen interpret existing evidence as pointing towards a
deterministic brain, Morse argues against altering the legal

144. John A. Humbach, Neuroscience, Justice and the “Mental Causation”
Fallacy, 11 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 191, 210–11 (2019); see also Adam J. Kolber,
Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807, 809 (2014) (“If we are
mechanisms—like clocks that tick but have no moral agency—we arguably
cannot be responsible at all.”).
145. Stephen J. Morse, Law, Responsibility, and the Sciences of the
Brain/Mind, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION AND
TECHNOLOGY 153, 155, 167–69 (Roger Brownsword et. al. eds., 2017).
146. Humbach, supra note 144, at 208–09 (discussing Professor Morse’s
“neuroskepticism”).
147. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775,
1782–83 (2004).
148. Morse, supra note 145, at 164.
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system without understanding more about “brain-mind and
brain-mind-action connections.”149
The field of neurolaw has also examined juvenile
neurological research specifically. Given developments in
neurologists’ understanding of brain development, many
neurolaw experts are calling for an end to mandatory transfer
laws.150 Scholars argue that while much about the brain remains
unknown, “[t]he scientific research on brain development is
sufficiently compelling . . . to require us to reconsider our views
on juvenile punishment as it is morally wrong and scientifically
unsound to hold juveniles to the same degree of responsibility as
adults who commit similar offen[s]es.”151
Under Greene and Cohen’s philosophical approach,
juveniles with abuse histories who murder, along with most
criminals, would not be culpable for their actions.152 Children
have no control over whether they face abuse, and whether that
abuse re-sculpts their growing brains in ways that make them
more likely to make rash decisions, distrust others, and
murder.153 The fault does not lie with the juvenile but rather
with their biology and their abusers’ decisions. Juveniles do not
make a conscious choice to grow an unfortunate genotype but
rather display its impact unknowingly. Under the retributivist
sentencing theory, it appears morally problematic to sentence
juveniles with abuse histories to lengthy sentences because they
had no control over the circumstances that led to their brain
chemistry that encouraged them to pull the trigger.154
Applying Stephen Morse’s neuro-skeptic framework to the
same issue, a slightly different but compatible result emerges.155
149. Humbach, supra note 144, at 203 (quoting Professor Morse).
150. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 147.
151. KATHERINE H. FEDERLE & PAUL SKENDELAS, THINKING LIKE A CHILD:
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAIN RESEARCH FOR
JUVENILE OFFENDERS, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 199, 213–14 (2009); see also
Francis X. Shen, Legislating Neuroscience: The Case of Juvenile Justice, 46 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 985, 1003–04 (2013) (discussing that, while courts have generally
declined to consider neurolaw evidence, multiple state and local legislatures
have begun discussing neuroscience in the context of juvenile justice, resulting
in variety of related bills); Francis X. Shen, Neurolegislation: How U.S.
Legislators Are Using Brain Science, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 495, 514 & fig.2
(2016).
152. See supra Part I.B.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See generally Morse, supra note 145.
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Stephen Morse would likely assert that juveniles with abuse
histories who murder are still responsible for their actions
because some amount of free will and moral cognition of their
wrongdoing existed when they acted.156 However, the Miller
framework of mitigation is not inconsistent with neuro-skeptics’
position. Under Miller juveniles remain legally culpable for their
crimes, but the neurological impact of their trauma history
serves as mitigating evidence at sentencing given the severity of
the risk factor of sexual trauma. This model is therefore
consistent, if not directly compatible with, a neuro-skeptic’s
position.157
Ultimately, neurolaw and Miller’s promise of mitigation for
familial and psychological circumstances threaten to burst the
foundation of the criminal legal system apart.158 If everyone is a
victim of their circumstances and brain chemistry, can anyone
be culpable for the crimes they commit? If trauma and abuse
histories serve as mitigating evidence, should most defendants
receive reduced sentences? While this author would argue that
most incarcerated people deserve increased psychological
treatment and reduced sentences, this Note specifically focuses
on juvenile abuse survivors who serve as an illustrative example
of the larger issue of the connection between trauma and
criminal legal involvement.
C. UNDER A UTILITARIAN THEORY OF PUNISHMENT,
INCARCERATING JUVENILE ABUSE SURVIVORS FOR DECADES
SERVES LITTLE PURPOSE
Under the Utilitarian theory of punishment, the needs of
society determine a defendant’s punishment.159 Under a pure
utilitarian approach, if a defendant showed no chance of
recidivism, they need not face punishment at all.160
Alternatively, a defendant brought in on minor jaywalking
charges who the court knew would murder hundreds upon their
release should remain incarcerated.161 Based on this theory,

156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Kolber, supra note 144, at 808.
159. Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 567 (2003).
160. See id. at 590–91 (discussing utilitarianism and criminal history).
161. See id.
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incapacitating juvenile murder defendants is only morally
correct until they pose a diminished threat to society.162
Because juvenile murder defendants, particularly those
with trauma histories, show potential for rehabilitation, longterm incarceration appears ineffective and morally questionable
under this theory.163 Generally, youth are more responsive to
rehabilitation and treatment than older people, meaning
juvenile LWOPers as a class are likely more receptive to
rehabilitation than older incarcerated people.164 Additionally, as
years in prison pass, juvenile LWOPers receive fewer
disciplinary infractions,165 suggesting a reduction in violent
behaviors. This pattern is noteworthy as disciplinary records
strongly predict recidivism.166
A significant body of research demonstrates how community
programming within schools and juvenile detention centers can
reduce juvenile crime.167 Robert Zagar, an influential
criminologist, conducted a study identifying high-risk youth in
Chicago, many with trauma histories, with a greater likelihood
of committing murders.168 When he provided a subset of
hundreds of these youth with interventions in the forms of
counseling, education, and programming, the murder rate
within this group fell by 47% compared to those who did not
participate in the program.169 Additionally, studies have
suggested that nurse home visiting programs can reduce the rate

162. See id.
163. Irving R. Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge’s Problem, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1960 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170910220243/https://
www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/flashbks/death/kaufman.htm].
See
generally O’Donnell, supra note 111 (explaining the effectiveness of individual,
group, and family therapy, community-based treatments, and mentorship).
164. See O’Donnell, supra note 111, at 7–8.
165. NELLIS, supra note 4, at 4.
166. Colby Lynne Valentine, Unraveling the Age, Prison Misconduct, and
Recidivism Relationship, 170 (2012) (Ph.D dissertation, Florida State
University College of Criminology and Criminal Justice).
167. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 76, at 27 (“A substantial body of research
over past fifteen years . . . show[s] that many juvenile programs, in both
community and institutional settings, can substantially reduce crime . . . by 20–
30 percent.”).
168. Robert Zagar et al., Delinquency Best Treatments: How to Divert Youths
from Violence While Saving Lives and Detention Costs, 31 BEHAVIORAL SCI. &
L. 381, 384 (2013) (reporting a recidivism rate of 12% within treatment
programs by psychologist Mark Lipsey); see GARBARINO, supra note 45, at 10.
169. GARBARINO, supra note 45, at 10.
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of substantiated child abuse and neglect by 50%.170 While this
rehabilitation occurred before any potential crimes, it reflects
the malleability and potential for change among high-risk youth
from under-resourced communities. Further, researchers have
found that the risk of recidivism increases with longer
sentences,171 showing that shorter sentences could serve a
utilitarian purpose better than lengthy sentences or LWOP
sentences.172
Additionally, violent offenders incarcerated for crimes like
homicide recidivate at lower rates than nonviolent offenders.173
Studies of recidivism rates nationwide and in specific states
have shown that homicide offenders recidivate at a lower rate
than offenders of almost any other serious crime.174 In a twentyyear study of released murderers in California, only 1% were
arrested for new crimes, none for murder.175 Multiple studies
have confirmed that a released homicide offender has a 1%
chance of ever killing again.176 This research indicates that

170. Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Understanding the Cycle: Childhood
Maltreatment and Future Crime, 47 J. HUM. RES. 509, 535 (2012) (citing Olds
et al., Prenatal and Infancy Home Visitation by Nurses: Recent Findings, 9
FUTURE CHILD., no. 1, 1999, at 44).
171. See, e.g., Thomas Orsagh & Jong-Rong Chen, The Effect of Time Served
on Recidivism: An Interdisciplinary Theory, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
155, 167 (1988) (“For some offense classes, recidivism rates will be reduced by
shortening the period of confinement.”).
172. See id. (“As the sentence becomes longer, expected legitimate earnings
and employment opportunities decrease because of the loss of contact with the
job market, expected earnings and employment in illegitimate activity
increase . . . , and the distaste or unwillingness to engage in 8 hours per day, 5
days per week work activity increases as one becomes accustomed to the
inactivity of prison life. All of these effects enhance post[-]prison criminal
propensities.”).
173. See Marieke Liem, Homicide Offender Recidivism: A Review of the
Literature, 18 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 19, 21 (2013); see also
WASHINGTON STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, RECIDIVISM OF
ADULT FELONS: 2007, at 2 tbl.2 (Apr. 2008), https://www.cfc.wa.gov/Publicatio
nSentencing/Recidivism/Adult_Recidivism_FY2007.pdf.
174. Liem, supra note 173.
175. Stephanie Slifer, Once a Criminal, Always a Criminal?, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/once-a-criminal-always-acriminal/.
176. Dana Goldstein, The Misleading Math of ’Recidivism’, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/04/themisleading-math-of-recidivism (citing PATRICK A LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEAS
ED IN 1994 (June 2002), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf).
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regardless of the rehabilitative potential of each juvenile
LWOPer, their chances of re-offending as a group are
statistically quite low,177 indicating that lengthy sentences serve
little utilitarian purpose for juvenile LWOPers.
Separate from any concern for these juveniles themselves,
shorter sentences and earlier public health interventions would
serve society’s financial and safety interests better than lengthy
incarceration.178 Studies have shown rehabilitative potential for
juveniles with abuse histories who engage in violence; however,
not all of them have access to the educational programming,
counseling, and community-based interventions that prove
effective at diminishing violent behavior.179 Scholars estimate
that “crime induced by maltreatment” costs society between $6.4
and $55 billion yearly,180 costs which legislatures could
proactively funnel into the community-based interventions
discussed above. By funding earlier interventions, society could
be spared emotional costs of loss of life and financial costs of
adjudication and lengthy incarceration.181
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, about 2,500 individuals sit behind bars who
received LWOP sentences as children,182 yet the proportion of
these individuals with abuse histories experienced increased
societal and neurological barriers to peacefully integrating into
society.183 This abuse should mitigate their sentences based on
both prominent theories of punishment and the legal rationale
behind the Supreme Court’s Miller decision; however, due to
mandatory transfer laws and lack of funding, this mitigating
evidence often remains unheard.184 A disparity exists between
the values the Supreme Court has espoused regarding juvenile
sentencing and the way those values are implemented by trial
courts at sentencing.185
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178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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Id.
O’Donnell, supra note 111; see NELLIS, supra note 4, at 2–4.
NELLIS, supra note 4, at 4.
Currie & Tekin, supra note 170, at 535.
Zagar, supra note 168, at 381.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
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Earlier interventions must exist to treat these children
before they murder. Without a shift in the current system,
children with abuse histories will continue to engage in violence,
harm victims and their families, and be funneled into a costly
system designed to punish rather than heal.
This Note prompts a broader question: to what degree do
circumstances outside of individuals’ control impact whether
they commit crimes? Do these circumstances change their
culpability? While sexual abuse represents one of the stronger
correlations between a trauma and later criminality, that
association holds true for childhood poverty, child neglect,
parental incarceration, and witnessing violence, among other
traumas. How should our legislatures, courts, and society reckon
with the emerging neurological data on trauma given the
difficulty of assessing causality? This Note unfortunately does
not provide an answer to those questions but urges us all to
begin asking them.

